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NOTES AND COMMENT

rule asserted in Reiter v. Grober, and extended the doctrine so as to
hold-as it had been held in numerous cases outside its own jurisdiction-that a mere marital relationship did not make the wife chargeable
with the contributory negligence of the husband. The principle had
previously been followed that one who stands in a blood or marriage
relationship to the driver has the negligence of the driver imputed to
him. (See cases cited in Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, at 496.)
In Oppenheim v. Barkin, 262 Mass. 281, 159 N E 628, cited in
Schmidt v. Leuthener, supra, it was held that a guest who was asleep
in the rear seat of ari automobile cannot recover for injuries received
notwithstanding that the driver was guilty of gross negligence, because
the guest had failed to look after his own safety and was therefore
guilty of contributory negligence. The decision, however, is not given
much weight by the Wisconsin court. It concludes that the fact that
each plaintiff was asleep had no casual connection with the collision.
Previous declarations of our Supreme Court, viewed apart from the
set of facts upon which they rest, would tend to indicate that the acts
of the two plaintiffs or their failure to act in the case of Schmidt v.
Leuthener would make them guilty of contributory negligence. For
example, it has been declared that the guest is bound to exercise due
care for his own safety in the matter of maintaining a lookout and must
give some heed to his own safety. See Howe v. Corey, 172 Wis. 537,
179 N.W. 791; Glick v. Baer, 186 Wis. 268, 201 N.W. 752; Krause v.
Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290.
The relationship between guest and host as to the exercise of ordinary care could reasonably be treated as a question of cause and effect.
The determination of the question depends upon the circumstances involved in each separate case. When the court in Schmidt v. Leuthener
makes causal connection between the alleged negligent acts and the
collision the test as to negligence, it expresses a proposition of law that
does not appear in the early host and guest cases and which doubtless
will serve as a safe guide in the judicious disposition of future host and
guest cases.
BERNARD SOREF

Contracts: Master and Servant: Advancement of Funds.
In rendering its decision in the recent case of Shaler Umbrella Co. v.
Blow, 227 N.W. 1, the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted a question it had never before directly considered. Consequently the doctrine laid down is based largely on modem reasoning and the rulings of
foreign courts.
The question before the court was, whether an agent employed on
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a commission basis is personally liable for advances in excess of commissions earned-there being no express agreement by the agent to repay such advances.
The pertinent facts in this case are that the plaintiff, the employer,
agreed under a parol contract to advance the defendant, and employee,
$50 a week for traveling expenses, and enough to enable his family to
live on. Moneys in excess of commissions earned were advanced by
the employer without making any express agreement for the repayment of such excess, and for the recovery of these excess advances the
employer brought this action.
Authority is divided on the subject.
"There is a personal liability on the part of the agent," reasons the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a recent case' considering the
same subject, for, "Had they (the parties) intended the advances should
be in lieu of salary and treated as such in event the commissions earned
by defendant were insufficient to balance the account, it would have
been a simple matter to have so stated. In the absence of a provision
in the contract we feel constrained to treat the advances strictly as
2
such and require the return of any excess."
By this interpretation the Pennsylvania court and those in accord
take the position that in such circumstances only matters clearly appearing in the contract itself are to be admitted, that every matter as
simple as this that can be included in the contract must be included or
-it will be construed in favor of the employer. Is it not just as
reasonable to say that, in case the advances were not stated to be intended in lieu of salary in case the commissions were insufficient, they
were intended to be?
The latter construction tends to a brief concise contract rather than
to a succession of "ifs and ands." As Justice Owens in delivering
the opinion of the Wisconsin Court says: "In a consideration of this
as well as all other contracts, the purpose is to discover the intent of
the parties. Neither reason or justice would place upon the agent the
entire burden of an adventure designed for the benefit of both parties.
Where there is no express provision it is not necessarily to be implied"
(that the agent is to repay) "from the term advancement,*, and ought
not to be implied in view of the general character of the undertaking."
That there is not a personal liability in such circumstances finds ample
'Smellenburg Clothing Co. v. Levitt, 282 Pa. 65, 127 A. 309.
'Accord: Clarke v. Eastern Advertiser Co., 106 Me. 59, 75 A. 303; Strauss
v. Cohen Bros. Co., 169 Ill.,
App. 337; Williams.Manufacturing Co. v. Michener,
13, Ontario Weekly Reporter, 46; Martinez v. Cathey (Tex. Civ. App.) 215 S.W.
370.
'Arbaugh v. Shockney, 34, Ind. A. 268, 71 N.E. 232, 72 N.E. 668.
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support in the better reasoned and more modern view of the Wisconsin
Court. Here there is an undertaking whereby an employer sends out
an agent to work upon a commission basis. This is in the nature of a
joint adventure, from which both hope to profit. The employer profits
by the development and enlargement of its business and the agent by
his compensation. The undertaking may prove a success or a failure.
But the agent will have the burden of the entire adventure if he is
required to repay all the advances made in excess of commissions
earned. Consequently the Wisconsin Court will not indulge in such
construction where there is no agreement on the part of the agent to
repay such excess.
The rule of law is aptly stated in 2 Corpus Juris, page 787, which
is cited in the Wisconsin decision and in the case of Roofing Sales Co.
v. Rose, 103 N.J. Law 553; 137 A. 211.
"In the absence of a special agreement an agent who receives advances on account of commissions cannot be held to a personal liability for such advances, although the commissions earned by him do
not equal the advances, and although his employment has ceased." 4
EDWARD L. METZLER

Fraud: Defense to the Action of Specific Performance.
On October 8, 1928, our Supreme Court handed down their decision
in the case of Gloede v. Socha, - Wis. -, 226 N.W. 950. Madeline
Socha, a widow, owned a piece of land adjoining Lake Michigan. Her
son sold sand from the beach. His competitor, Henry Gloede, Jr., knew
that Mrs. Socha would not sell her land to him so he got Blessinger, a
real estate agent and old neighbor of his, in whom she reposed confidence
to approach her. Blessinger told her he was buying the land for a
party in Chicago, that he would not disturb her son's sand business
and when he (Blessinger) returned a second and third -time after conferring with the plaintiff, said he had been talking to the Chicago party
by telephone. A land contract for the sale of the land was made and
part of the money was paid by the plaintiff. When the defendant became aware of the fact that the plaintiff was the purchaser she tendered
the money paid her back to the plaintiff and refused to complete the
sale. Gloede then brought an action to enforce specific performance of
the land contract. The municipal court of Racine County gave judgment for the defendant and plaintiff appealed.
'Accord: Luce v. Consolidated Ubero Plantations Co., 195 Mass. 84, 80 NE
793; Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Mooney, 108 N.Y. 118, 15 N.E.
303; Schnabel v. American Educational Alliance, 79 Misc. Rep. 624, 140 N.Y.S.
848; Lester C. Hebberd and Co. v. Blake (Sup.) 175 N.Y.S. 478; Goldberg v.
Kleiiberg (Sup.) 179 N.Y.S. 364.

